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“To meet his constitutional and ethical obligations, a prosecutor 
should . . . approach the preparation of a case with a healthy skepticism . . . He should 
not assume his witnesses are telling the truth . . .”1 
“The often close relationship between prosecutors and police make detection 
of police fabrication unlikely.”2 
“[Manhattan District Attorney] Vance’s efforts to make prosecutors 
smarter . . . depend on what he calls ‘extreme collaboration’ with the Police 
Department . . . working hand in glove with the investigators from the police . . . ”3 
The prosecutor’s constitutional and ethical duty to truth is central to many of 
Bennett Gershman’s illuminating and trenchant articles about the role of the 
prosecutor.4  And while ruminating about that obligation conjures up the need for 
systematic and aggressive investigation while a criminal case is pending, in this 
essay I argue that nowhere is that duty more critical than at the very moment when 
a decision is made whether to file charges.5  Specifically, I argue that to meaningfully 
actualize their duty to truth, prosecutors must extricate themselves from their extant 
close relationships with the police by adopting a deliberately confrontational 
approach to police witnesses.  Moreover, once a case is charged, they must overcome 
their longstanding reluctance to liberal disclosure by immediately providing defense 
counsel with all available discovery. 
Scholars have written about the complicated relationship between prosecutors 
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1 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 342 (2001). 
2 Id. at 348 n.212. 
3 Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance Jr.’s ‘Moneyball’ Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014. 
4 See Gershman, supra note 1. 
5 To be clear, I am referring to “street crime” cases where a police officer makes an arrest and a prosecutor 
is called upon very soon thereafter to make a decision regarding filing charges, as opposed to cases involving 
lengthy investigations prior to an arrest. 
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and police officers in various macro contexts.6  My focus is specifically on the 
prosecutor’s role in ferreting out police perjury, or put more kindly, ensuring that 
police accounts of what happened—what they did and why they did it—are truthful.7 
While the police decide who to arrest, it is the prosecutor who then decides 
what to do with that arrest—whether to prosecute and what charges to file.8  At that 
moment in time, the primary function of the prosecutor must be to serve as a robust 
and steadfast gatekeeper;9 to ensure that the police fully respected the accused’s 
constitutional rights and that there is sufficient evidence to warrant filing charges.10 
Yet even amid a documented history of police corruption in the form of perjury11—
lying in reports and lying on the witness stand—prosecutors  regularly abdicate this 
vital function and perfunctorily file charges based on the unexamined word of the 
arresting officer.12 
Most criminal courts concentrate on, and expend significant resources at, the 
accused’s arraignment or initial appearance before a judge.  At that time, very little 
is known about the facts of the case, the accused, any victim, any witnesses, the 
arresting officer, and any other police involved in the case.  Yet in many busy urban 
criminal courts, like in New York City, approximately half of all cases will end at 
the accused’s very first appearance.13  And the moment charges are filed, let alone 
resolved by any kind of guilty plea, the defendant will be saddled with a host of 
6   See, e.g., Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 98 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 n.65 
(2018) (“The relationship between prosecutors and police is complicated.”); Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, 
Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 301, 312 (2017); Kate Levine, How We 
Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745 (2016). 
7   Despite the title of this essay, I approach this subject presupposing a genuine interest and legitimate 
commitment on the part of prosecutors to eradicate police perjury, and I focus on how it can best be quickly 
identified. 
8   Not to mention other critical decisions such as what bail to recommend and what plea offer to make. 
9   Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 6, at 312 (“It is also important to recognize that the prosecutor is the 
gatekeeper of the system, uniquely positioned to mediate between the police and the judiciary . . . ”); David 
Neubauer, After the Arrest: The Charging Decision in Prairie City, 8 L. & SOC’Y REV. 495, 497 (1974) (whoever 
controls the charging decision is the gatekeeper and regulates inputs into the court). 
10  There is much disagreement regarding just how sure a prosecutor should be of the accused’s guilt before 
filing and thereafter prosecuting criminal charges.  See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 1, at 353–54 (prosecutor should 
be personally convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before pursuing charges); Bruce A. Green & Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 
497 (2009) (“The charging decision calls for some gatekeeping to avoid prosecuting innocent individuals, but there 
is no agreement on how much.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1521, 1547 (1981).  See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2012) (“The 
prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported 
by probable cause.”). 
11  See infra notes 16–38 and accompanying text. 
12  Levine, supra note 6, at 758 (prosecutors file charges without checking the evidence presented by the 
police); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 116 (2012) ("Prosecutors fail to screen and 
instead charge arrestees based solely on allegations in police reports.”). 
13  JUSTIN BARRY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK OF N.Y. CITY CRIM. CT., CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK ANNUAL REPORT 2011 29 (2012). 
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debilitating consequences.14  Even if the charges are ultimately dismissed, the fact 
that charges were filed may follow that person in perpetuity.15  It is for these reasons 
that it is critical that prosecutors do all that is possible to ensure the truth and 
constitutionality of the charges before any formal accusatory instrument is filed in 
court. 
Since in many cases the assessment of truth begins and ends with the narrative 
provided by the arresting police officer, how can, and should, prosecutors evaluate 
the veracity of what police officers tell them?  That fundamental and critical question 
must be examined against the indisputable historical backdrop of prevalent police 
perjury.  Commentators, scholars, and practitioners—judges and prosecutors, as 
well as defense attorneys—have long acknowledged that police perjury is an ever-
present reality.16 
In New York City, it has become commonplace in the past decade for whoever 
is the Mayor to hold a press conference announcing that the crime rate is at a new 
low.17  During that same time period, a federal judge found that the New York City 
Police Department’s stop-and-frisk practices violated the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Fourth Amendment’s commandment against unreasonable search and 
seizure.18 Broken Windows policing ensnared and criminalized hundreds of 
thousands of men of color.19 Police killings of unarmed Black men spawned the 
14  See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953 (2018); Jenny 
Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (2017); Joe, supra note 6; The Prosecutor’s 
Client Problem, 98 B.U. L. REV. 885 (2018); Shaila Dewan, The Collateral Victims of Criminal Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2015. 
15  See, e.g., Martin v. Hearst Corporation, 777 F.3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015) (local newspaper not liable for 
continuing to run story on its website of plaintiff’s arrest even after charges dismissed and arrest records erased 
pursuant to state statute); Smith v. Sandusky Newspapers, Inc., Case. No. 3:17 CV1135, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103245 (N.D. Ohio June 20, 2018). 
16  Former Ninth Circuit federal judge Alex Kozinski was quoted as saying that “[i]t is an open secret long 
shared by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges that perjury is widespread among law enforcement officers.” 
Stuart Taylor, Jr., For the Record, AM. LAW, Oct. 1995, at 71.  See also Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False Witness: 
Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 445, 448 (2008) (“substantial evidence 
demonstrates that police perjury is so common that scholars describe it as a ‘subcultural norm rather than an 
individual aberration.’”); I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 870 (2008) 
(former prosecutors describe police lies as “commonplace” and “prevalent”); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little 
Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1311–12 (1994) (“Judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and repeat offenders all know 
that police officers lie under oath.  The empirical studies on the subject suggest that perjured testimony is 
common . . . ”); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1037 (1996); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the 
Chicago Criminal Courts; 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 95–99 (1996) (prosecutors admit that police perjury is a reality). 
17  See, e.g., J. David Goodman, New York Crime Rate Keeps Falling, Mayor de Blasio Says; Cites Years 
of ‘Momentum,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2014; Jen Chung, NYC Hits Record Low Murder Rate in 2012, Bloomberg 
and Kelly Start Bragging, GOTHAMIST (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://gothamist.com/2012/12/28/nyc_hits_record_low_murder_rate_in.php. 
18  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp.2d 540, 658–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
19  See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives From Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-
Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 291 (2009); NEW YORK ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF “BROKEN WINDOWS” POLICING IN
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Black Lives Matter movement calling for, inter alia, greater oversight and 
accountability of law enforcement.20  Prosecutorial approaches to police perjury 
must also be considered in light of this present condition of decreasing crime and 
increasing calls for police accountability.21 
Discussions of police perjury in New York usually begin with reference to 
People v. McMurty.22  In that case, criminal court Judge Irving Younger wrote about 
the emergence of “dropsy” testimony after the Supreme Court decided in Mapp v. 
Ohio23 that the exclusionary rule—the suppression of evidence remedy for unlawful 
searches and seizures—applied to the states.24  Post-Mapp, police officers began to 
testify that the defendant dropped contraband to the ground as the police officer 
approached.  The logic behind dropsy testimony is simple—if the defendant 
abandoned the illegal items before the police engaged with him, there was no search 
to litigate.  One study of pre- and post-Mapp cases concluded bluntly: “police are 
lying about the circumstances of such arrests so that the contraband . . . will be 
admissible.”25 
Given the seemingly irrefutable proof that police officers were committing 
perjury and had lied about their cases from the very inception, what changes or 
reforms, if any, were enacted by the offices of the District Attorney to detect, 
confront, and eradicate police perjury? 
The only publicly known proposed remedy for the perjury problem was actually 
suggested by the defense.  In People v. Berrios,26 the defense argued that to alleviate 
the possibility of perjured testimony in dropsy cases, the prosecution should bear the 
ultimate burden at pretrial suppression hearings of proving the legality of the search 
and seizure, rather than the extant rule that required the defense to bear the burden 
of showing inadmissibility.  In a move that unequivocally signaled the seriousness 
of the perjury problem, the Manhattan District Attorney sided with the defense: 
However, the District Attorney of New York County informs us, in the 
NYC AND GENERAL NYPD ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PUBLIC (2018). 
20  For discussion of the genesis, focus, and principles of the movement, see, e.g., Julius Bailey & David 
J. Leonard, Black Lives Matter: Post-Nihilistic Freedom Dreams, 5 J. CONTEMP. RHETORIC 67–69 (2015).
21  New York City provides one lens through which to view the problem of police perjury and 
accountability.  Many other cities have experienced similar issues.  See, e.g., Peter J. Boyer, Bad Cops, THE NEW
YORKER, May 21, 2001 (the Rampart Division scandal in the Los Angeles Police Department); Emily DePrang, 
Houston Police Dept. Plagued by Fresh Scandal, Old Denial, TEXAS OBSERVER, Sept. 26, 2014; Jason Meisner, 
Cook County Prosecutors Bar 10 Chicago Cops from Testifying Because of Ties to Corrupt Ex-Sgt. Ronald Watts, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 24, 2018; Matt Rocheleau & Danny McDonald, Former Public Safety Secretary to 
Consult with Scandal-Plagued State Police, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2018. 
22  314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Crim. Ct. 1970). 
23  367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
24  McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 196. 
25  Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 
1960–62, 4 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 549, 549–50 (1968). 
26  270 N.E.2d 709, 712 (1971). 
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brief submitted on these appeals, that “For the last ten years participants 
in the system of justice—judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and police 
officials—have privately and publicly expressed the belief that in some 
substantial but indeterminable percentage of dropsy cases, the testimony 
(that a defendant dropped narcotics or gambling slips to the ground as a 
police officer approached him) is tailored to meet the requirements of 
search-and-seizure rulings” and “it is very difficult in many (such) cases 
to distinguish between fact and fiction.”27 
The offered remedy was in fact the proverbial drop in the bucket.  Pretrial 
suppression hearings are few and far between,28 and this change in the burden of 
proof would likely have had little to no impact on the prosecutor’s initial decision to 
file charges.  Nevertheless, the appellate court declined to adopt the new rule 
suggested by the defense. 
Even with the public recognition of substantial police perjury, New York City’s 
District Attorneys failed to take any effective, affirmative steps to address and 
eradicate the problem, and twenty years later the existence of widespread police 
perjury was again exposed. 
In 1992, then-New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins assembled the Mollen 
Commission in response to numerous and spreading allegations of drug dealing and 
corruption in several police precincts.29  The Commission's charge was "to 
investigate the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate the 
Department's procedures for preventing and detecting corruption; and to recommend 
changes and improvements in those procedures.”30 
The Mollen Commission’s final report discussed at great length what it called 
“falsifications,”31 and broke down this form of corruption into three categories: 
testimonial perjury, documentary perjury, and falsification of police records.32  To 
highlight the extent of the problem, the Commission noted that the practice of 
falsification was so prevalent that in some police precincts it had its own term—
27  Id. at 714 (Fuld, C.J., dissenting). 
28  Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
315, 321 (2005). 
29  See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Dinkins Names Police Corruption Panel and Urges Civilian Police 
Review, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Al, B2 (reporting on Dinkins's appointment of a five-member anti-corruption 
panel, headed by former Deputy Mayor for Public Safety, Milton Mollen). 
30  MILTON MOLLEN, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION
AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMMISSION REPORT 1 (1994), at 1 [hereinafter 
“MOLLEN REPORT”]. 
31  Id. at 36. 
32  Id.;  See Joe Sexton, New York Police Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1994, at A1 
(“New York City police officers often make false arrests, tamper with evidence and commit perjury on the witness 
stand, according to a draft report of the mayoral commission investigating police corruption.”); Joe Sexton, Types 
of Perjury Common Among Police Officers are Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1994, at 27 [hereinafter Sexton, 
Types of Perjury]. 
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“testilying”33—and concluded that falsifications were “probably the most common 
form of police corruption facing the criminal justice system.”34 
The Commission’s report occasioned much hand wringing,35 finger pointing, 
and promises of police reform, but there was little, if any, attention paid to the 
culpability of the prosecutors who, at best, had the wool pulled over their eyes and 
who, at worst, turned a blind eye to perjury.36 
Again, the critical question looms—confronted with evidence of substantial 
police perjury, what steps did New York City’s District Attorneys take to make sure 
their line prosecutors readily discerned it from the start and declined to initiate 
criminal charges?  There is yet again ample evidence that police perjury is alive and 
well.37  Recent concerns about perjury even caused a federal judge to take the bold 
and unprecedented step of holding a hearing to ascertain the prevalence of lying by 
New York City police officers.38 
As advocates call for a reexamination of the close relationship between 
prosecutors and police officers, some District Attorneys actually seek to strengthen 
those ties.  In a wide-ranging interview for New York Times Magazine, the 
Manhattan District Attorney emphasized the need to develop and maintain 
especially close working relationships with the police.  He referred to “extreme 
collaboration” between prosecutors and police, leading the reporter to note the 
symbiotic “hand-in-glove” relationship the District Attorney wished to foster.39 
Myriad explanations have been offered as to why prosecutors have been unable 
to stem the tide of police perjury.  Some accounts focus on the failure to detect 
perjury.  In the context of whether prosecutorial conviction review units should be 
managed by independent entities or current prosecutors from the office under 
review, Barry Scheck points to cognitive biases that limit our ability to be self-
33  MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 30, at 36. 
34  Id. 
35  Sexton, Types of Perjury, supra note 32, at 27–28 (the Brooklyn District Attorney called the Mollen 
Commission report “significant” and his counterpart in Queens called it “terribly troublesome”). 
36  Similar omissions were discovered in the inquiry into the Rampart Division scandal in the Los Angeles 
police department.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing With Police Abuse: The 
Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 305, 308 (2001) (asking what the Los Angeles prosecutors’ 
offices could have done to uncover the police department’s Rampart Division scandal, and noting that there was 
no inquiry or post-mortem of any kind directed at the prosecutors’ offices). 
37  See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013; Joseph Goldstein, 
‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2018, in BLUE LIES, A SERIES OF STORIES
EXAMINING THE ENTRENCHED CULTURE OF ‘TESTILYING’ IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; Joseph Goldstein, 
He Excelled as a Detective, Until Prosecutors Stopped Believing Him, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2017;  Olivia 
Bensimon & Emily Saul, Ex-NYPD Detective Facing 5 Years in Jail After Pleading Guilty to Perjury, N.Y. POST, 
Aug. 3, 2018. 
38  Cordero v. The City of New York, 282 F.Supp.3d 549, 557 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Joseph Goldstein, 
Brooklyn Judge Seeks to Examine Prevalence of Police Lying, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2017. 
39  Brown, supra note 3. 
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critical; that we are, to a great degree, blinded by our extant relationships.40  
“Groupthink,” a term coined by social psychologist Irving Janis, occurs when a 
group makes flawed decisions because group pressures lead to a deterioration of 
“mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.”41  Rather than think 
critically, let alone skeptically, about what the group is doing, the group members 
ignore alternatives and coalesce quickly around decisions. 
The same concerns arise to the extent that a prosecutor has a sense of being on 
the same “side” as the police; that they are both part of the law enforcement 
apparatus.42  The more they feel that way the less likely they are to second-guess a 
“teammate.” 
However, most analyses of police perjury focus on the ways prosecutors 
deliberately overlook, or ignore, falsifications.  Many scholars highlight the 
prosecutor’s need to maintain a close working relationship with police officers for 
investigative and testimonial purposes, and suggest that reality might blind them to 
perjury or lead them to discount or disregard it.43  Raising an accusation of perjury 
would obviously impact the prosecutor’s relationship with that specific police 
officer, and could have a ripple effect with other police officers in the same 
department. 
In spite of well-worn admonitions from the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct44 and the Supreme Court45 that prosecutors should be concerned with 
40  Barry Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units Revisited, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 705, 739 (2017). 
41  IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOS 9, (1972). 
42  See, e.g., Jonathan Abel, Cops and Pleas: Police Officers’ Influence on Plea Bargaining, 126 YALE L.
J. 1730, 1733 (2017) (referring to the “working group of prosecutors and police, commonly known as the
‘prosecution team’”); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 141 (referring to “mutual orientation toward ‘getting the bad guys’”).
43  Michael Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871: The Problem of Police Perjury, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2005) (“To function effectively, prosecutors depend on the police to investigate crime.  
The police, in turn, rely upon prosecutors to obtain convictions through the judicial system.  These mutually 
dependent and supporting roles inevitably require prosecutors and police to work closely together on a regular 
basis.  A prosecutor who files perjury charges against a police officer risks jeopardizing this vital relationship with 
his law enforcement team.”); Asit. S. Panwala, Law Enforcement and Criminal Offenders: The Failure of Local 
and Federal Prosecutors to Curb Police Brutality, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 639, 651 (2003); Jay Sterling Silver, 
Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 358 
n.75 (1994) (discussing the need for "smooth working relations");  Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 6, at 326
(“prosecutors work with and rely on police in the long term”). 
44  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”).  See also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 3-1.2 cmt. (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.”). 
45  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“[The prosecutor’s] interest, therefore in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”).  The New York Court of Appeals put it 
this way: “It is not enough for [a district attorney] to be intent on the prosecution of his case.  Granted that his 
paramount obligation is to the public, he must never lose sight of the fact that a defendant, as an integral member 
of the body politic, is entitled to a full measure of fairness.  Put another way, his mission is not so much to convict 
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seeking justice as opposed to winning cases, many prosecutors might ignore 
falsifications because they are focused on obtaining convictions, a mindset 
Gershman refers to as the “conviction mentality.”46  As the Mollen Commission 
report concluded: “[S]everal former and current prosecutors acknowledged—‘off 
the record’—that perjury and falsifications are serious problems in law enforcement 
that, though not condoned, are ignored.”47  Other commentators ascribe more direct 
culpability to prosecutors, and suggest a degree of complicity in permitting, if not 
encouraging, perjury.48 
There are also the affective or attitudinal rationales.  Some prosecutors might 
be less than concerned about perjury because they believe most defendants are guilty 
anyway and that the means justify the ends.49  Others might have just simply given 
in to the seemingly inevitable and intractable nature of police falsifications.50  
Commentators have also suggested that prosecutors shy away from acknowledging 
police perjury because it is ultimately difficult to prove given the notorious Blue 
Wall of Silence.51 
Bennett Gershman argues forcefully that to actualize the “duty to truth,” 
prosecutors should maintain professional distance and independence from the 
police.  Gershman observes that, “[c]uriously, despite extensive documentation of 
erroneous convictions, widespread prosecutorial abuses that contribute to wrongful 
convictions, and a plethora of academic literature on the ethical responsibilities of 
prosecutors, there has been little discussion of the prosecutor’s legal and ethical duty 
to truth.”52  He argues that those duties derive from several sources, including the 
as to achieve a just result.”  People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 393 (1980). 
46  Gershman, supra note 1, at 353.  See also PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF
JUSTICE 116 (2009) (“We all like to win.  For prosecutors, that means getting tough sentences and defeating 
defendants’ claims that the police violated their constitutional rights.”). 
47  MOLLEN REPORT, supra note 30, at 42; Sexton, Types of Perjury, supra note 32 (“perjury for the sake 
of an arrest is accepted”). 
48  See, e.g., Rosanna Cavallaro, Police and Thieves, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1448 (1998) (prosecutors 
who worked with corrupt officers “demonstrated a level of knowledge that amounts to complicity”). 
49  Gershman, supra note 1, at 353; Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall” of Silence as 
Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 263 (1998) (“it 
is possible that some prosecutors may actually approve of police perjury, at least when it leads to the ‘correct’ 
result”); Slobogin, supra note 16, at 1058 (prosecutors and judges winking at lying). 
50  Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence: Does Society Condone Police Brutality in Exchange for Getting 
Criminals Off the Streets?, A.B.A. J., July 1991, at 46 ("Prosecutors shrug when police officers offer less than 
credible testimony; judges sigh and turn their heads."); Slobogin, supra, note 16, at 1046 (referring to a study 
finding “stunning evidence of prosecutorial and judicial nonchalance”). 
51  Chin & Wells, supra note 57, at 261–62; Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of 
Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 221–222 (2000); Lisa C. 
Harris, Note, Perjury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1755, 1774 (1996) (asserting that prosecutors will often 
not pursue perjury charges because of difficulty of prevailing due to lack of physical evidence and evidentiary 
burdens). 
52  Gershman, supra note 1, at 313. 
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constitutional obligation not to use false evidence,53 and he emphasizes the 
prosecutor’s duty to prejudge the truth by “making an informal adjudication of the 
defendant’s guilt and the credibility of witnesses.”54  In order to make this “informal 
adjudication,” he urges prosecutors to “examin[e] facts skeptically” and to take an 
“aggressive commitment” to truth rather than an “agnostic approach.”55 
A central theme runs through Gershman’s duty to truth—prosecutors should 
evaluate the proof with a “healthy skepticism.”56  More specifically, the prosecutor 
“should not assume that his witnesses are telling the truth.”57  Gershman singles out 
dropsy scenarios and advises prosecutors to be “suspicious,” “rigorously test the 
hypothesis of guilt,”58 and assume an active role in “investigating contradictory 
evidence of innocence.”59 
Gershman argues essentially that a culture shift—an ethically and 
constitutionally mandated transformation—is necessary to overcome the 
impediments to the duty to truth outlined above.  In an earlier piece, he wrote with 
concern about the ingrained ethos of “overzealous prosecutorial advocacy,”60 and he 
addresses that concern by urging prosecutors to adopt a skeptical and suspicious 
attitude toward the evidence and statements of witnesses.  In similar fashion, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, writing about the Los Angeles Police Department’s infamous 
Rampart Division disgrace, noted that prosecutors failed to “challenge” and were 
reluctant or unwilling to “press” police officers about the truth of their narratives.61  
He recommended that prosecutors should aggressively investigate and evaluate the 
credibility of police witnesses.62 
However, if past is prologue, suspicious and skeptical attitudes toward police 
witnesses will not be sufficient to tackle the entrenched problem of police perjury.  
Cultural shifts can only occur if there are institutional changes.  Instead, prosecutors 
must adopt a purposely confrontational stance marked by combative adversarial 
53  Id. at 314. 
54  Id. at 316. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 342. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 347. 
59  Id. at 348.  Even the standards of professional behavior recommend against too close a working 
relationship between prosecutors and police officers.  ABA Standard 3-3.2, "Relationships with Law 
Enforcement," advises prosecutors, inter alia, to "maintain respectful yet independent judgment when interacting 
with law enforcement personnel."  2015 CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3-3.2(b) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2015). 
60  Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 458 (1992).  While some scholars 
urged that prosecutors respond to accusations of zealotry by adopting a more neutral posture, others found the 
notion of neutrality to be unhelpful.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 837, 840 (calling the idea of prosecutorial neutrality “unenlightening” in that it “encompasses a range 
of norms, each of which is itself uncertain in meaning.”). 
61  Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 310. 
62  Id. at 316. 
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testing of police officer narratives. 
The suggestion of adversarialness is not so farfetched.  Although we purport to 
have an adversarial system of criminal justice, few would argue that most criminal 
courts, dominated by rapid guilty pleas as opposed to trials, are actually adversarial 
in practice.63  Given that reality, it would be beneficial to actually insert a measure 
of adversarialness into the process.64 
It is also the case that the wave of recently elected self-styled progressive 
prosecutors presents a propitious time to re-examine the relationship between police 
and prosecutors.65  These prosecutors ran on platforms promising to end mass 
incarceration by ending tough-on-crime policies and transforming longstanding 
prosecutorial practices.66  In St. Louis, prosecutor Kim Gardner, elected in 2016, 
recently issued a written statement proclaiming that her office would no longer 
accept cases brought by twenty-eight specified police officers, a so-called 
“exclusion list,” due to concerns about their credibility and veracity.67 
63  See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 
2118 (1998); William T. Pizzi, The American “Adversary System”?, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 847 (1998); Zeidman, 
supra note 28, at 339 (“Although the Criminal Court has been fraught with problems, an overabundance of 
adversarialness is not one of them.”). 
64  In fact, the relationship between prosecutors and police may already be antagonistic or adversarial if 
viewed from the vantage point of the police.  Recently in New York City, the Manhattan District Attorney has 
publicly lamented his inability to get police personnel files from the Police Department, and the ways that frustrates 
and harms prosecutors’ abilities to effectively and fairly perform their jobs.  Mike Hayes & Kendall Taggart, The 
District Attorney Says the NYPD Isn’t Telling Prosecutors Which Cops Have a History of Lying, BUZZFEED (June 
2, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/mikehayes/nypd-cops-lying-discipline-disrict-attorneys-
prosecutors.  While much has been written about how prosecutors see their relationship with police officers, there 
is a dearth of scholarly legal literature analyzing the same relationship from the point of view of police officers. 
65  See Justin Miller, The New Reformer DAs, AMERICAN PROSPECT, (Jan. 2, 2018), 
http://prospect.org/article/new-reformer-das (referring to grassroots advocacy by organizations like Color of 
Change, with funding from, among others, George Soros’s Open Society Foundation, to elect progressive District 
Attorneys in several places across the country). 
66  Id. 
67  Christine Byers, St. Louis Prosecutor Says She Will No Longer Accept Cases from 28 City Police 
Officers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-
louis-prosecutor-says-she-will-no-longer-accept-cases/article_6d8def16-d08d-5e9a-80ba-f5f5446b7b6a.html 
(The prosecutor’s statement observed trenchantly that “Police officers play an important role in the criminal justice 
system, and the credibility of officers is one of the most important attributes of the job,” and further that “[a] police 
officer’s word, and the complete veracity of that word, is fundamentally necessary to doing the job.  Therefore, 
any breach in trust must be approached with deep concern.”).  Still, whether self-proclaimed progressive 
prosecutors can make meaningful change remains to be seen.  In Philadelphia, the police union has openly rebuked 
Larry Krasner, the reform-minded prosecutor. Joe Trinacria, Philly FOP President Blasts DA Krasner in Letter to 
Police Cadets, PHILA. MAG., Mar. 2, 2018.  And as with every aspect of the criminal legal system, race is front 
and center.  In St. Louis, staff prosecutors moved to unionize with police officers soon after African-American 
lawyer Wesley Bell took over for long-time prosecutor, Bob McCulloch, a white man who failed to indict Police 
Officer Darren Wilson for killing 18-year-old Michael Brown.  Akela Lacy, Before Criminal Justice Reformer is 
Even Sworn in, St. Louis Prosecutors Have Joined a Police Union, THE INTERCEPT, Dec. 20, 2018.  For some, the 
problems inherent with vast prosecutorial power mean that any reforms will ultimately have little meaningful 
impact on the criminal legal system.  Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748 
(2018). 
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While asking prosecutors to take a confrontational or adversarial stance toward 
police officer witnesses might on its face seem extreme, consider the cycles of 
perjury revelations in New York alone.  Consider the hundreds of thousands of 
illegal stops-and-frisks that went undetected by local prosecutors until a federal 
judge intervened.68  Consider that multiple homicide convictions were thrown out in 
Brooklyn after wrongly convicted people served decades behind bars based on 
testimony from a key detective that turned out to be, putting it mildly, less than 
credible.69 
Perhaps, given the inherently interwoven nature of the prosecutor/police officer 
relationship, the best approach is to cede the initial interview for pre-charge 
screening purposes to an independent group or organization comprised of, among 
others, members of the affected community, or to establish and enable such an entity 
to regularly review prosecutorial charging practices.  As two eminent prosecutorial 
ethics scholars observed: 
Maintaining independence from the police is difficult as a practical matter. 
Whether or not prosecutors work hand-in-glove with police in the 
investigative stage, prosecutors are dependent on the police. . . . At a 
minimum, prosecutors and police officers deal with each other 
professionally on a daily basis, and must treat each other as colleagues. 
They may become friends, and identify, with their counterparts.70 
A direct role for civilian community members in matters of policing surfaced 
as a result of the federal stop-and-frisk class action in New York City.71  After 
finding that the City of New York was liable for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of the plaintiff class, Judge Shira Scheindlin turned her attention 
to fashioning remedies, and detailed the importance of giving the affected 
community a seat at the table: 
[C]ommunity input is perhaps an even more vital part of a sustainable
remedy in this case. The communities most affected by the NYPD's use of
stop and frisk have a distinct perspective that is highly relevant to crafting
effective reforms. No amount of legal or policing expertise can replace a
68  Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
69  Chelsea Rose Marcius & James Fanelli, Dirty Detective Louis Scarcella Insists, 'I've Done Nothing 
Wrong,' Despite Sending 13 Wrongfully Convicted People to Jail, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 20, 2018 (referring to 
“shady investigations involving tainted evidence, misleading testimony or forced confessions” in nearly a dozen 
homicide cases that resulted in 13 people being wrongfully convicted). 
70  Green & Zacharias, supra note 60, at n.95.  See also Sally Kohn, First Mike Brown, Then Eric Garner: 
Prosecutors Can't Be Trusted to Try Cops, DAILY BEAST, Dec. 3, 2014, https://www.thedailybeast.com/first-mike-
brown-then-eric-garner-prosecutors-cant-be-trusted-to-try-cops (“Attorneys who usually work hand-in-hand with 
the police in pursuing other criminal cases can’t honestly be expected to be impartial and aggressive in then 
prosecuting those same officers.”). 
71  Floyd, 965 F. Supp. 2d 540 at 620–21. (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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community's understanding of the likely practical consequences of 
reforms in terms of both liberty and safety.72 
Judge Scheindlin created a Joint Remedial Process and specified that it should 
include, inter alia, members of the communities where stops most often take place; 
representatives of religious, advocacy, and grassroots organizations; representatives 
of groups concerned with public schooling, public housing, and other local 
institutions; local community leaders; and Communities United for Police Reform.73 
In similar fashion, community members most impacted by police and 
prosecutorial practices should play a role in whether arrests proceed to criminal 
charges.74 
There is, of course, no sure-fire way to detect with certainty if someone is lying. 
Even if it were feasible for prosecutors to administer some kind of lie detector test 
to police officers at the initial interview, there is general agreement that the results 
of such examinations are of limited utility.75  Similarly, while there is a plethora of 
books and articles that proclaim to be able to teach people how to spot when 
someone is lying,76 those purported techniques have been subject to much 
criticism.77 
72  Id. at 686. 
73  Id. 
74  See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1623 (2017) (“There is reason to think that if those most likely to be arrested and 
incarcerated were given truly equal influence over policy, and if policymaking happened more locally, then the 
criminal justice system would be less rather than more punitive.”); Note, The Paradox of “Progressive 
Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 759 (2018) (“the prosecuted should be integral to the process of crafting 
these reforms.”). 
75  See, e.g., Jennifer Vogel & Madeleine Baran, Inconclusive: The Truth About Lie Detector Tests, 
AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA, Sept. 20, 2016, https://www.apmreports.org/story/2016/09/20/inconclusive-lie-
detector-tests; Nigel Barber, Do Lie Detectors Work?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, March 7, 2013, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-human-beast/201303/do-lie-detectors-work.  While law 
enforcement agencies continue to use various forms of lie detector, or polygraph, tests for hiring, security clearance 
and other purposes, courts vary as to whether results may be used for any reason at trial.  Polygraph results are 
generally viewed as unreliable and inadmissible for any purpose in New York.  People v Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 
1335 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Shedrick, 489 N.E.2d 1290, 1292 (N.Y.1985). 
76  See, e.g., Rachel Gillett & Samantha Lee, You Can Tell Someone's Lying to You by Watching their 
Face, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.sg/how-to-tell-someones-lying-by-
watching-their-face-2016-1 (discussing book by former FBI agent Mark Bouton, “How to Spot Lies Like the FBI,” 
that suggests analyzing facial expressions and associated reactions); Ellen Hendriksen, How to Tell if Someone is 
Lying, SCI. AM. (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-tell-if-someone-is-lying1 
(suggesting focus on physiological reactions such as gestures and facial expressions, and then listening for various 
cues like whether the narrative is too chronologically pat or full of linguistic convolution). 
77  Still, however, serious efforts at how best to detect lying are ongoing and merit study and analysis.  See, 
e.g., Jacqueline R. Evans et al., Validating a New Assessment Method for Deception Detection: Introducing a
Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool, J. OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN MEMORY & COGNITION, Mar.
2013, at 33, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.02.002 (testing a new credibility assessment tool, the
Psychologically Based Credibility Assessment Tool (PBCAT), and concluding that results indicate that it is
capable of improving deception detection performance, even with minimally trained, nonexpert observers).
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Most people would, however, likely agree about one feature of our ability to 
detect lying—we are more likely to be successful if we are talking to someone face-
to-face as opposed to over the phone or via some kind of video conference.78  Yet in 
New York City, a decision was made several years ago that the arresting officer no 
longer had to meet face-to-face with a prosecutor to enable her to decide on charges 
and to draw up a criminal complaint.79  Instead, the arresting officer can, and does, 
literally phone it in.80  The logic behind the change in practice was twofold: crime 
was high and police officers needed to be on the street rather than waiting in line to 
be interviewed in the prosecutor’s office, and it was cost effective—often, the 
waiting to be interviewed led to overtime.81 
Presently, however, New York is in the midst of a heralded and unprecedented 
decrease in crime.82  Further, the police department has moved some measure away 
from its zero tolerance application of Broken Windows, or quality-of-life, policing 
that insisted on massive arrests for minor crimes and offenses.83  Less crime and 
fewer directives to make arrests for minor offenses means that police officers can, 
and should, be available to meet face-to-face with a prosecutor for each arrest they 
make. 
The initial interview between arresting officer and prosecutor is the moment of 
truth for the prosecutor’s duty to truth.  That face-to-face interview must be radically 
reconceived if there is a bona fide commitment to rooting out perjury. 
The interview must be adversarial in every sense of the word.  For starters, the 
interview should be videotaped to prevent police officers from conforming future 
testimony to meet constitutional objections or to fill holes in the prosecution’s case. 
The police officer should be subject to rigorous cross-examination, under oath and 
subject to perjury, by a cadre of prosecutors specifically trained to take on this 
78  A New York Daily News analysis found that most parole interviews in New York State are now 
conducted via video-link as opposed to in-person, and highlighted the challenges that presents for parole board 
members when trying to assess the interviewee’s veracity and authenticity.  See Stephen Rex Brown, Trevor Boyer 
& Reuven Blau, N.Y. Parole commissioners travel the state to conduct video hearings and rarely step inside 
prisons, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan, 20, 2019. 
79  Chuck Sudetic, Plan Streamlines Booking in 14 Brooklyn Precincts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995 (“[w]e 
all used to think you had to see a police officer and a victim sitting across a table,” quoting an assistant district 
attorney). 
80  See Zeidman, supra note 28, at 349–50; Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful 
Convictions: Do We Really Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1361–62 (1997). 
81  Joseph P. Fried, TV Speeds Cases from Police to Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1995 (“[v]ideo 
teleconferencing is about efficiency, processing arrests and returning police officers to the street as quickly as 
possible,” quoting then Police Commissioner William J. Bratton). 
82  Tina Moore, NYC Crime Continues to Plummet in 2018, N.Y. POST (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://nypost.com/2018/02/06/nyc-crime-continues-to-plummet-in-2018. 
83  Benjamin Mueller, New York City Will End Marijuana Arrests for Most People, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/nyregion/nypd-marijuana-arrests-new-york-city.html; David Colon, 
Manhattan DA Will End Criminal Prosecution of Fare Beaters this Fall, GOTHAMIST, June 30, 2017, 
http://gothamist.com/2017/06/30/manhattan_da_fare_evasion.php. 
436 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 16:423 
crucial task and who embrace their role as adversaries.84 
The police officer should be required to bring all paper work to the interview, 
including anything filled out by any other police officers.  The prosecutor should 
demand to see all forms of potential corroboration from other police officers or 
witnesses, and all 911 and related radio calls and tape from any police or private 
video cameras. 
The prosecutors must monitor and track suspicion of perjury against individual 
officers so that suspicions are confirmed and repeat offenders are caught.85  In 
addition, prosecutors’ offices must maintain and regularly analyze detailed data 
about each officer—the number of arrests that day, week, month year; what were 
the arrest charges; what were the salient facts alleged by the officer; all available 
allegations of misconduct; etc.86  We live in an era of data compilation and analysis. 
The New York City Police Department regularly lauds its “CompStat” program that 
reflects a data-driven approach to policing.87  The Manhattan District Attorney’s 
Office has similarly embraced data collection: “It’s the ‘Moneyball’ approach to 
crime . . . The tool is data; the benefit, public safety and justice . . . Some of the 
defendants are often surprised we know so much about them.”88  Prosecutors should 
similarly know “so much” about police officers. 
In New York, the law requires that complaints allege “facts of an evidentiary 
character,”89 providing reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed the 
crime charged.90  New York’s highest court has emphasized the need for specific 
factual allegations as opposed to conclusory, generic statements.91  And yet, the 
Court’s call for factually rich and specific complaints has yielded a set of 
templates.92  To ensure they stand up to scrutiny, prosecutors should draft detailed 
accusatory instruments that support the crimes charged as well as the 
84  This is in stark contrast to the ways that New York City District Attorneys have typically staffed the 
“complaint room.”  Usually, it has been used as a training ground for new prosecutors.  In Brooklyn, the District 
Attorney at one point used per diem non-lawyers to handle the initial interview and to draft the charges.  
85  Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 312. 
86  It was owing to hearing repeated “dropsy” narratives that a judge was able to recognize and identify a 
pattern of potential perjury in McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 195–97.  In similar fashion, a judge took the rare step of 
granting a subpoena for a Police Officer’s personnel files and Civilian Complaint and Review Board records after 
defense counsel produced several complaints where the officer gave the same dropsy story.  People v. Parnell, 789 
N.Y.S.2d 827 (N.Y. 2004). 
87  For an introduction to Compstat, see generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, POLICE EXEC.
RESEARCH FORUM, COMPSTAT: ITS ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND FUTURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2013); 
Chris Smith, The Controversial Crime-Fighting Program That Changed Big-City Policing Forever, NEW YORK
MAGAZINE, Mar. 2, 2018. 
88  Brown, supra note 3. 
89  N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §100.15 (McKinney 2005). 
90  People v. Dumas, 497 N.E.2d 686 (N.Y. 1986). 
91  People v. Alejandro, 511 N.E.2d 71 (1987). 
92  Zeidman, supra note 28, at 345. 
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constitutionality of the search and seizure.93 
And if prosecutors fully embrace the duty to truth, they must reconsider their 
extant approach to disclosure.  Subject to any necessary redactions out of valid 
concerns for safety of a victim or witness, the tape of the initial interview should be 
immediately turned over to the defense for the arraignment or initial appearance.  All 
paperwork should be turned over to the defense.94  All radio calls or videotapes 
should be turned over to the defense.  And so too should all data regarding the 
arresting officer be turned over to the defense.95 
This liberal approach to discovery obviously requires a seismic cultural change. 
As it is, criminal appeals reflect persistent turmoil spanning more than half a century 
regarding exculpatory evidence the prosecution is required to turn over to the 
defense pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.96  In New York, annual efforts to reform the 
state’s strict discovery laws are vigorously and successfully opposed by the New 
York State District Attorney’s Association.97  Yet the well-documented existence of 
phenomena like implicit bias, confirmation bias, and tunnel vision dictate that 
prosecutors should include defense perspectives in the analysis of a police officer’s 
narrative.98  This degree of openness also accords with the increasingly loud calls 
for prosecutorial transparency and accountability.99 
93  Although facts establishing probable cause are not required by statute, the decision in Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), finding rampant Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection 
violations, should serve as a clarion call for proof of the lawfulness of the arrest to be clearly reflected in the 
criminal court complaint. 
94  See, e.g., Jodi Nafzger, Leveling Felony Charges at Prosecutors for Withholding Evidence, 66 DRAKE
L. REV. 307, 349 (2018) (discussing “open-file” discovery, whereby the prosecution turns over its entire file to the
defense, to enhance transparency); Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2017).  Several states have already moved toward more robust discovery.  See, e.g., Janet
Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1329,
1332, 1371–72 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the benefits of liberal discovery, and
arguing that open file discovery increases “fairness, finality, and efficiency of criminal adjudications”). 
95  Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 320. 
96  373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing the prosecution’s obligation to provide the defense with evidence that 
might exonerate the accused or mitigate punishment).  See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations 
Happen? Cognitive Bias and Beyond, 37 CHAMPION 12 (2013) (discussing the myriad reasons—negligence, 
cognitive bias, mistakes, office culture and policy—that Brady issues persist); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New 
Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943 (2010). 
97  Jake Offenhartz, Movement to Reform New York’s Discovery Statute Faces a Familiar Foe: 
Prosecutors, THE APPEAL (Mar. 6, 2018), https://theappeal.org/movement-to-reform-new-yorks-discovery-
statute-faces-a-familiar-foe-prosecutors-4b2bd2f8ac/. 
98  Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1603 (2006) (re prosecutorial confirmation bias); Mark D. White, Tunnel Vision in 
the Criminal Justice System, PSYCH. TODAY (May 25, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/maybe-
its-just-me/201005/tunnel-vision-in-the-criminal-justice-system; Scheck, supra note 47 (cognitive biases dictate 
that conviction review units should be helmed by, or at a minimum include, defense attorneys). 
99  Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2016) 
(discussing the mounting pressure to hold prosecutors accountable); Dan M. Clark, New DAASNY President Urges 
Cuomo to Reject Bill to Create Misconduct Board, N.Y.L.J., July 5, 2018 (regarding bipartisan legislation to 
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And when perjury is discovered, prosecutors must prosecute.100  Historically, 
prosecutors are loath to charge police officers with perjury, and so it is unlikely that 
fear of prosecution deters police falsifications.101  While the oft-stated rationale for 
the exclusionary rule is that it would serve to deter police from violating the 
constitution,102 many have opined that officers would more likely be deterred if they 
felt a more personal sting, such as suspension from work and/or docked pay.103  In 
similar fashion, it seems inherently logical to imagine that subjecting officers to 
criminal sanctions would have a salutary effect on perjury. 
Finally, there are considerations aimed at the prosecutors—should evaluations 
of their performance be based to any extent on their efforts to stamp out police 
perjury?104  Scholars urge that performance standards should value examination of 
decisions not to prosecute in addition to the ever-present focus on convictions.105  
Always lurking is the question of liability—can, or should, a prosecutor ever be 
liable criminally, civilly, or ethically?  Currently, despite wielding vast power, 
prosecutors are effectively shielded from any meaningful legal accountability by 
rules of absolute and qualified immunity.106  It is similarly exceedingly rare for 
prosecutors to be professionally disciplined by external committees that investigate 
establish a prosecutorial oversight commission). 
100 Peter Walkingshaw, Prior Judicial Findings of Police Perjury: When Hearsay Presented as Character 
Evidence Might Not Be Such a Bad Thing, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 6 (2013) (the most obvious mechanism 
for deterring police perjury is probably criminal prosecution of the officers who commit it). 
101 Chin & Wells, supra note 57, at 261 (“Police criminality, including police perjury, even where guilt is 
clear, has not traditionally been dealt with aggressively be prosecutors.”); Cloud, supra note 16, at 1313 (rarely 
are police officers prosecuted, let alone punished, for perjury); Hon. Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, 
Returning Majesty to the Law and Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 35, 47 n.52 (1996) 
("Perjury cases are not often pursued, and perhaps should be given greater consideration by prosecuting attorneys 
as a means of enhancing the credibility of the trial system generally."). 
102 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Daniel S. 
Schneider, The Future of the Exclusionary Rule and the Development of State Constitutional Law, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 377, 384 (1987).  Former Chief Justice Burger opined that law enforcement would indeed be deterred if 
evidence “is suppressed often enough.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
103 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still Preoccupied with 
1985” to “Virtual Deterrence,” 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 743 (2010); Nicole Haas, The Remedy of Last Resort, 23 
WIDENER L. REV. 115 (2017). 
104 Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 97. 
105 Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 320–21 (prosecutor performance is tied to conviction rates); Medwed, 
supra note 50, at 172.  Professor Tracey Meares suggests providing financial incentives for prosecutors to 
accurately charge defendants.  Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995).  More generally, Professor 
Jason Kreag recommends using data analytics to measure prosecutorial performance.  Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial 
Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771 (2017). 
106 See, e.g., Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1981) (“because a prosecutor is acting as an 
advocate in a judicial proceeding . . . the introduction of illegally-seized evidence at trial does not create liability 
in damages”); Frederic Block, Let’s Put an End to Prosecutorial Immunity, The Marshall Project, Mar. 13, 2018. 
2019] FROM DROPSY TO TESTILYING 439 
wrongdoing by lawyers or by their superiors in the District Attorney’s Office.107 
There is, however, a burgeoning movement to discard prosecutorial impunity in the 
face of growing discontent and dissatisfaction with the status quo.108  No doubt that 
was part of the reason why New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed a bill 
establishing a first of its kind statewide commission to investigate allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct, despite vociferous objection from the New York State 
District Attorney’s Association.109  And while many believe these are drastic 
measures, the truth is that entrenched policies and attitudes have to change if the 
duty to truth is ever to become paramount and consequential. 
107 Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses 
of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 143 (2016); Thomas 
P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for
Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2015); Radley Balko, Another Study Finds Few Consequences
for Prosecutor Misconduct, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 2017; Zeidman, supra note 28, at n.208; Andrea Elliott &
Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the Price, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004.
108 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 16, at 1058 (proposing a liquidated damages remedy); H. Mitchell 
Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51 
(2014) (“To deter further misconduct and abuse of power, prosecutors must be punished more severely than 
attorneys who hold less distinguished and privileged positions. For example, prosecutors guilty of misconduct 
could be punished as willful perjurers, which can carry a heavy penalty.”); Shaun King, A Historic Bill in New 
York Could Create First-of-Its-Kind Accountability for Prosecutors—If Andrew Cuomo Doesn’t Veto It, THE
INTERCEPT, June 22, 2018. 
109 See Leonard Greene, Cuomo Signs Prosecutorial Misconduct Bill in Bid to End Wrongful Convictions, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug.20, 2018. 
